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Abstract 
This paper follows the conceptual definitions offered in 
Eduard Said’s “Orientalization” and Maria Todorova’s 
“Balkanization” toward newly coined term of “West-Balkanization”, 
all as essential features of constructing the Otheness. In this sense, the 
identities generated by colective definition by the Other (The West), 
are seen in the abstract symbolic values of the region, which can be 
traced in real social and political events. Yet, in the modern age the 
only political perspective for the Balkan is integration with in the 
West. With the new mainstream of the political and economical 
integration of the Balkan countries into the European Union the legal 
frame for mutual direct communication and collaboration is being 
created. The future projections for this region are movement toward 
integration into the European Union. So the mutual European identity 
project can be imposed on the region of the Balkans itself. But at the 
same time Europe has created a West Balkan region, which besides 
being a symbolic waiting room, can be seen as political ghettoization 
of few problematic national issues and in David Noris terms as “the 
last line of defense against Muslim east”. 
The second part of the paper is focused on the Republic of 
Macedonia, and its position during the last two decades. It refers to 
several aspects of the structural position of the country, as well as 
essential aspects of demography, inter-ethnic relations, regional 
politics and economy, all united under the Macedonia’s prospects for 
future Euro- Atlantic integration. The last can generate sense of 
political stability, but also an exclusion from negative symbolism 
related to historical “Balkanization” or future “West- Balkanization”.    
Key words: Balkan, West Balkan, West, Orient, Macedonia, 
Stereotypes 
 
 
 
Strashko STOJANOVSKI 
 
 
202                                   Balkan Social Science Review, Vol. 1, June 2013, 201-216 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we are making an effort to analyze factors that determine the 
origin and symbolic meaning of the term “Balkanization”. In this sense the political 
significance of the definition of Otherness is closely connected with stereotyping. 
The Balkans as a politically abstract region offers the possibility to be a border 
region between East and West, but also as a geographically integrated area that 
compliments traditions and the future prospects.  
  Historically, the idea of “Balkanization” started in middle of nineteen 
century, when the rational West faced the remains of the Ottoman Empire. The 
mystification of the East in this period included both Christian and Muslims, which 
were carriers of an exotic irrational past. At the same time Western prospects of the 
Balkan population were recognized and manifested through the Enlightenment and 
the attempts to create their own past, connected with the Western values. So, the 
road to independent westernized nation- states was created. But, in southeastern 
Europe does not rule the climbing that the nation has created independent state, as 
the romanticist nationalists dreamed. As a matter of fact, the leaders of new states 
were forced to create the nation from the peasant society and the world-view 
coming from their “non legitimate Ottoman past” (Мазовер, 2003: 122).1 The 
beginning of twentieth century promoted the great national concepts of the Balkan 
states. In the search of their own identity, the Balkan nations tried to define their 
national frameworks based on the idea of ethnic identity with a strong linguistic 
core (Todorova, 2009: 240).   
Modern education, architecture, fashion and state organization, were not 
sufficient for the Balkan states to be accepted as an integral part of the symbolic 
West. The Balkan wars, both in 1912-13 and the 1990-s, together with Communist 
period of domination (1945-1991), left the Balkans as a region of irrational politics 
and, negative stereotypes, with little prospect for total Westernization. Even with 
opened prospects for EU and NATO integration for some of the Balkan countries, 
                                                          
1 Todorova will notice: “Of the political legacies that have shaped the southeast European 
peninsula as a whole (the period of Greek antiquity, Hellenism, Roman rule, etc.), 
two can be singled out as crucial until the 19th century. One is the millennium of 
Byzantium with its profound political, institutional, legal, religious and general 
cultural impact. The other is the half millennium of Ottoman rule that gave the 
peninsula its name, and established the longest period of political unity it had 
experienced. Not only did part of Southeastern Europe acquire a new name during 
this period, it has been chiefly the Ottoman elements or the ones perceived as such 
which have mostly invoked the current stereotype of the Balkans. In the narrow sense 
of the word, then, one can argue that the Balkans are, in fact, the Ottoman legacy” 
(Todorova, 2005: 69). 
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Western powers had reservations that the region would be entirely integrated. Pure 
political integration does not mean integration of values. Parallel to this, in the 
beginning of twenty first century, a new imaginative region of the “West Balkans” 
was established, mainly by European Union bureaucracy. This term, in very short 
time managed to synthesize both Orientalism and Balkanization, creating new 
abstract reality. 
Orientalism, Balkanization and West-balkanization 
In his famous book “Orientalism”, Eduard Said begins with the assumption 
that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the 
Occident itself is not just there. If men make their own history, what they can know 
is what they have made, and extending this idea to geography: both geo-graphical 
and cultural entities—to say nothing of historical entities —such as locales, regions, 
or geographical sectors as "Orient" and "Occident" are man-made. “Therefore as 
much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of 
thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for 
the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each 
other” (Said, 1977: 4,5). 
In this sense Said refers on unequal distribution of values construction, 
where because of its economic, political and cultural dominance, the West becomes 
the standard of defining the “oriental” Otherness. Furthermore the process of 
rationalization, individualization and liberalization promotes the West as a carrier of 
the Civilization2 itself (Elijas, 2001). The Western view of the East was based on 
magical exoticness, which is felt or as a taboo, or is repulsive, which imposes on the 
East a natural inferiority (Said, 1977: 37-76).3 Through this can be applied to the 
                                                          
2 The function of “Civilization” in western self conscience contains “the progress itself, 
which the western society believes that it has created versus the previous centuries, 
but also and in relation to modern “primitive” societies. Those, the western society is 
determinating with the markers of its pride: technical development, their ethics, 
development of scientific knowledge and their vision of the world, and many other 
things” (Elijas, 2001: 55).    
   
3 Said noted: “For the Orient idioms became frequent, and these idioms took firm hold in 
European discourse. Beneath the idioms there was a layer of doctrine about the 
Orient; this doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many Europeans, all of 
them converging upon such essential aspects of the Orient as the Oriental character, 
Oriental despotism, Oriental sensuality, and the like. For any European during the 
nineteenth century—and I think one can say this almost without qualification—
Orientalism was such a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche's sense of the word. It is 
there-fore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was 
consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric. Some of the 
Strashko STOJANOVSKI 
 
 
204                                   Balkan Social Science Review, Vol. 1, June 2013, 201-216 
 
past, some of the modern thinkers are even referring to non-West as Other, 
searching for demarcations and distinctions of the world civilizations and not 
offering possibility for understanding or integration.4 
Following this pattern Maria Todorova in her “Imagining the Balkans”5, 
shifts the focus from the West- Orient relations, to the narrow region of South-East 
Europe, or the area frequently referred to as the Balkans.  Since the nineteen 
century, the writers from the West are have offered, often opposite views of the 
Balkan people. What is significant in that period, and even today, is the easiness 
with which anthropologists emphasize single events to produce generalizations that 
can be applied to a wider region. In the expressed racial vocabulary of nineteen 
century, the “Turks” are seen an Asiatic nomad people and as an antitheses of 
European civilization (Мазовер, 2008: 192). For Croatian Dubravka Ugresic, the 
positive stereotypes are exclusively reserved for the West, and negative for the 
East.6 For Todorova the Western discourse of the Balkan does not originate from 
                                                                                                                                                     
immediate sting will be taken out of these labels if we recall additionally that human 
societies, at least the more advanced cultures, have rarely offered the individual 
anything but imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism for dealing with "other" 
cultures. So Orientalism aided and was aided by general cultural pressures that 
tended to make more rigid the sense of difference between the European and Asiatic 
parts of the world” (Said, 1977: 203, 204). 
 
4 For example Samuel P. Huntington in his famous essay “The Clash of Civilizations?”, 
which later was extended into a book, clams that the world conflicts in post Cold War 
era are determined from the fault lines of the civilizations (Huntington, 1993).  
  
5 Except Maria Todorova’s “Imagining the Balkans”, significant impact had and several 
other editions as: Vesna Goldsworthy’s “Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the 
Imagination”, Stathis Gourgouris “Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and 
the Institution of Modern Greece”, Milica Bakic’s “Nesting Orientalism”, Obrad 
Sabic and Bjelic’s (ed.) “Balkan as a Metaphor” and others. 
 
6 West Europe (Right, Organized, Democracy, Civilized, Legitimate, Rational, Pointed 
toward the future, Established system of values and criteria, Individualism, Citizen)- 
East(Left, Disorganized, Democracy seen only through democratic symbols, 
Primitivism, Non legitimate, Myths, Necrophilic obsession from the past, Non 
existence of system, Collective conscience, Nationalism) (Noris, 1999: 62). 
Like Orientalism, Balkanism has been organized around a sense of binaries 
(rational/irrational, center/periphery, civilization/barbarism) arranged hierarchically 
so that the first sign (“Whiteness” of “Europe”), is always primary and definitional of 
the second (“Blackness” of “Balkans”), and is that the second is always a 
grammatical, internal effect of the first…The question that remains whatever is 
whether or not every system of colonial representation based on binaries is by 
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the historical Balkan backwardness, but from the unreal romanticism projected 
toward the Balkans (Todorova, 2009: 59). 
The Balkans have become a “place” in a discourse-geography, presented as 
an object of coherent body of knowledge – Balkanism. Bjelic argues that the term 
Balkanism has changeable meanings. Sometimes it refers to the body of knowledge 
about the Balkans, and sometimes to the critical study of this very discourse. 
Balkanism in the first sense delivers substantive knowledge about the Balkans 
without examining the presuppositions upon which this knowledge has been 
generated, for example Robert D. Kaplan in his book “Balkan Ghosts: A Journey 
Through History”. As in Maria Todorova’s book “Imagining the Balkans“, 
Balkanism in the second sense examines the Balkans in relation to suppositions 
constitutive of Balkanism in the first sense- that is, as an epistemology (Bjelic, 
2002: 5). Kiossev continues this debate focusing on few questions. “Thus, along 
with questioning the numeric identity of the Balkans, one should ask whether or not 
there are groups or individuals who feel that they belong to the Balkans. The first 
question is, “What are the Balkans?” …The second question is then, “Who is Homo 
Balkanicus?”. In other words, what collective and what individual, recognize itself 
as Balkan? These questions might further lead us to several others: Does Homo 
Balkanicus exist at all? What nuances distinguish the feeling of belonging, or non-
belonging, to the Balkans?”(Kiossev, 2002: 167).  
Mocnik clearly states that the stereotype of the Balkanist kind may serve as 
privileged instrument that enables a particular ideology capable of incorporating 
such stereotype into its own discourse, to invent, and eventually appropriate the 
position of knowing subject of the national zero- institution. “Balkanist stereotypes 
and others like them, can work as shifting devices: What more, the shifting the 
stereotype supports does not limit itself to the relatively benign interpretational 
effects of understanding – the stereotype incorporates different ideological 
backgrounds into the prevailing framework of common sense. It may serve as the 
royal road toward the ideological hegemony.” (Mocnik, 2002: 102, 103).  
As for Mishkova the idea of the Balkans entwined of the project of 
modernity with notion of “Europe, or the enlightenment of utopian and real 
meanings, that accounts for the resilience of the term “Europe” and for the 
difficulties involved in any attempt to unravel its autonomy. The “idea of Europe” 
spawned over time and of the analytical objections to treating “(Western) Europe” 
as an entity and a coherent unit of analysis. It is, at the same time, easier to presume 
                                                                                                                                                     
definition Orientalism or, more importantly, are the binaries of Said’s good for the 
marginals and outsiders?  (Bjelic, 2002: 3). 
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that just as the discourse of Balkanism has helped to shape the self-understanding of 
Europe, so too have Balkan perceptions of Europe shaped local narratives of 
collective cultural and social identity (Mishkova, 2007: 5,6). 
Yet, the fact is that there is no mutual Western stereotype for the Balkan. 
This does not mean that there are not mutual western patterns of construction, but 
that there is no unified West. In this sense there are many different relevant political 
and intellectual discourses, dispersion of attitudes and opinions inside the different 
Balkan countries (Todorova, 2009: 170). But the Balkan people always built 
perceptions of them-self’s not as a part of the East and the Orient, but as an integral 
part of the West. The offer by the West for inclusion into their cultural zone through 
romanticism, ideology and nation state, from Balkan point of view, is an 
opportunity to gain recognition and obtain a guarantee for its own historically 
legitimate political ambitions (Noris, 1999: 40). This process of cultural evolution 
has taken place over centuries and continues to the present day. The cultural 
adaptation to the “Western” standards is a precondition for integration into the 
Euro- Atlantic institutions, which for the different Balkan people is a guarantee for 
their own national legitimization, first in the framework of the region and later into 
the global world order.   
The recent moves toward EU and NATO integration promote a new 
imaginative region of West Balkan7. But the name “West”, does not offer 
symbolical interaction with the term “Balkan”, creating a less integrative symbolic 
approach. West Balkan was a political creation, which later develops in all other 
realms of social life and interaction.8 In a political sense, West Balkan integrates the 
                                                          
7 West Balkan by theritory initialy was defined as “Ex- Yugoslavia minus Slovenia, plus 
Albania”, or it includes Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania.  
See more http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/political-map-of-the-western or 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/westernbalkansmap.html.  
But, the last tendencies are to exclude Croatia from the region. For example, see 
http://www.balkansgeotourism.travel/index.php.    
8 In this sense the term “Balkan” was used without political connotation or reflections in 
some cases, for example when is derived from the context of the narrow geographic 
region “Balkan” connected with Balkan Mountains in Bulgaria. This usage of the 
term has only positive stereotypes connected with it. Opposite to this “West Balkan” 
as pure politically developed term does not offer extraction of its negative 
presumptions. For example, even the usage of this term in sense of pure geography, 
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“unstable” Balkans, offering the rest of the region to disengage from negative 
stereotypes, and, at the same time, creates a new imaginative region that can serve 
as a political ghetto. Open national questions as Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian, 
together with a significant part of Balkan Muslim population are isolated with 
promise that this is the fastest road for integration within the West. The basic 
question is: “Does the new process of West-Balkanization, offer better prospects of 
the region, or just create preconditions for future instability?”     
 
Republic of Macedonia: Between Balkanization and Europeanization 
In the 1990-s with the big changes in Eastern Europe, Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had transformed its political and economic system 
into pluralistic democracy and free market economy. But the instability in 
federation produced further changes, which resulted in disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the formation on new nation- states. Macedonian independence can be traced to 
September 8, 1991, when independence was established through referendum. New 
challenges were numerous. Economic and political stability, together with 
international recognition were the first issues tackled.9   
In the next twenty years Macedonia encountered numerous problems such 
as securing its economic and political stability, integrational challenges toward 
Euro-Atlantinc institutions and sustaining its unitary character. In the middle of the 
last decade of the twentieth century, the Republic of Macedonia was positioning its 
status in the international community as a novel country, facing economy sanctions 
brought against Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY) and a unilateral blockade by 
Greece. With recognition from USA, and the start of bilateral negotiations with 
Greece concerning “the name issue”, the focus shifted toward Euro- Atlantic 
integrations (EU and NATO). But in 1999, stability was challenged with the 
Kosovo crises, and later in 2001, the conflict in its own borders. The last ten years 
                                                                                                                                                     
nature or tourism promotions (See “The West Balkan, Land of Discovery”), contains 
a covert political message.  
 
9  First multi partial elections for Macedonian parliament were on September 24, 1990. In 
January 1991, Kiro Gligorov was elected for first president of the republic. 
Previously, on January 25, 1991 was adopted “The Declaration for independence of 
SR Macedonia”. On the base of this Declaration, on September 8, 1991 on 
referendum was proclaimed the independence, and on November 17, 1991 the first 
constitution was proclaimed. On April 8, 1993 the Republic of Macedonia (under the 
provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was accepted as a 
member of United Nations, becoming 181th  member country.  
Strashko STOJANOVSKI 
 
 
208                                   Balkan Social Science Review, Vol. 1, June 2013, 201-216 
 
have been characterized by the process of stabilization, inner reforms, and the start 
of the integration processes toward EU and NATO.   
In sense of nation building models, the process depends on several key 
factors. For Raphael Utz successful nations are defined as democratically 
constituted nations. From this point of view he argues that democracy is the natural 
form of government for nations, and that nationalism and democracy depend on 
each other (Utz, 2005: 615-647). In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, from the 
first day of independence there is no alternative to democracy. But developing 
democratic capacities of the state institutions is also a challenge. The main problem 
is the transformation of traditional authoritarian discourse into individual citizen 
and voter based democracy. Creating democratic traditions has faced problems in 
several areas, for instance inter-ethnic relations, elections, NGOs or civil sector and 
media control.  
The second significant element that Utz addresses is the role of the elites in 
the nation building process. Though it may appear to be easier to reach a sufficient 
degree of consensus among relatively and small and well-educated number of 
individuals rather than across a wide population. According to Utz, most members 
of any given elite represent vested interests, regions, or professions and reaching an 
agreement is by no means a foregone conclusion (Ibidem). In the case of 
Macedonia, the elites have different origins and several motivations. Significant 
levels of the elites (economic, political and intellectual) are the product of the late 
stage of the pre- independence period. Transforming the generations of elites is a 
process parallel to the global nation building. Also the elites are very often 
motivated by ethnic, regional, and especially traditional interests of the larger 
kinship group interests, which influence the process of building a sense of mutual 
interests and national homogenization.  
And the third segment pointed out by Utz is the role of symbolic 
institutions. For him, it is important to keep in mind that in a national context, all 
public institutions take on an additional symbolic meaning: not only are they 
supposed to perform certain political, social or economic functions but they also 
form a visible surface of the nation. The historical record would suggest that it can 
be helpful to remove predominantly symbolic institutions from the political fray as 
much as possible in order to preserve their meaningfulness beyond political 
partisanship (Ibidem). In the Republic of Macedonia the usage of symbolic 
institutions in the sense of political and ethnic mobilization has always been present. 
Political ideology in the global world framework incorporates national symbols and 
uses national manifestations for generating support. But from the other side in the 
case of Macedonia there is an opposite process in some of the political options, 
which differently motivated (ethnic or ideology differences) create voluntarily 
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based self- exclusion from the usage of those national symbolic institutions. The last 
one is not limited to political mobilization but also, includes the necessity of 
building institutional and state loyalty and, sustaining a certain level of symbolically 
based group cohesion.            
Nation and state building in the Republic of Macedonia depends on 
numerous factors, which address the economical capacities of the state, inter- ethnic 
relations, regional stability, functional democracy, and integration in EU and 
NATO.  
Regional stability is one of the most important factors for creating 
preconditions for successful development of all aspects of progress in Macedonia. If 
the Balkans (in last ten years limited to the newly created region of Western 
Balkan) do not provide stability there are no long-term prospects for successful state 
and nation building in any of the countries in the region.  
With the end of the Cold War period, in the Balkans were actualized three 
national questions, under which the last decade of twentieth century was marked 
with rise of collective emotions and growth of nationalisms. The first question is the 
Serbian question, related to the space of the ex-SFR Yugoslavia, where the Serbian 
communities were used for generating the Greater Serbian idea. The same question 
today is related to the political status of Serbian entity of the Republic of Srpska in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the status of Serbian population in enclaves in 
Kosovo. We should point out that the priority that has been given to this question in 
1990-s in the territory of Croatia, after the forced migration on the Serbians from 
Kninska Kraina, has today lost its actuality; The second question which led to the 
awaking of nationalism is the Albanian question, connected with the final solution 
of the status of Kosovo and the status of Albanians in Macedonia, together united 
with the radical idea of the creation a Greater Albania; The third question, is the 
Macedonian question. This last question has significant differences from the 
previous two in the fact that it is not connected with the great national idea of 
Greater Macedonia, but is manifested by cultural and historical clash with Greece, 
connected with the differences concerning the name issue and the recognition of 
Macedonian minority in Greek Macedonia, non recognizing of the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the differences with 
Bulgaria in the reading of history. All together, these problems are united around 
the idea of not recognizing Macedonian national identity as separate and 
independent. 
The last tendencies of the integration of the countries of South-East Europe 
in EU and NATO, leads to the promotion of the West Balkans, as imaginative 
region which is uniting, and on that way ghettoize previous three mentioned 
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questions.10 But the transferring of the pejorative perception and terminology from 
the Balkan, to the region of Western Balkan, does not offer quick solutions for the 
existing problems and integration into European Union institutions in the near 
future. Quite the opposite, this type of isolation only increases the danger of 
creating new conflicts. The manifest expression of this kind of potential conflict 
situation is expressed by the intentions of radical nationalisms so the Balkan nations 
use this situation of created an historical vacuum for their own interest, but on 
behalf of their neighbors. 
Economic development has always been a state and national priority in the 
Republic of Macedonia. After the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia the economic 
sustainability of the market was reshaped into smaller economies of the newly 
formatted nation states. The economic crisis was intensified with the transformation 
of the economies toward the free market. All of the resulting republics, except 
Slovenia, went through a long time of painful transformation. In the case of 
Macedonia’s economy, additional problems in the early stages were created by 
economic blockade from Greece and sanctions toward FR Yugoslavia, and later the 
political crises produced by the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the conflict in 
2001 in Macedonia. The last several years have been marked by the world 
economic crisis and its influence in the region.  
Structural reforms produced by the different governments in the Republic of 
Macedonia created preconditions for boosting development, but the investments are 
yet dependent of the perception of regional (in)stability. Parallel to the economic 
development is the process of decreasing population produced by a low birth rate 
and physical resettlement, which resulted with mass economic migration in certain 
regions of the country. In the future this may be the biggest problem facing not just 
Macedonia, but also other countries in the region.         
Inter- ethnic relations is the core of keeping Macedonia’s prospects open. 
For Adamson and Jovic Macedonian national identity revolves around the concepts 
of ‘full statehood’ and ‘majority’. This implies a diminution of the collective 
political status of Macedonian Albanians. Albanian nationalist platforms contest the 
moral validity of the Constitution, which embodies these concepts.  At the same 
                                                          
10 Based on previous context there is Western perception for the Balkan and Adriatic’s 
(today transferred on the Western Balkan) as “last line for control and defense against 
the Muslim East” (Noris, 2002: 18). From this point of view Western Balkan as 
continuation of the Ottoman Empire is related with the Turkish integration into 
European institutions. Also we can expect after closing the final status of Kosovo and 
finding final political solution accepted by the Security Council and International 
community, Serbia will take the primary position and become a leader on the 
Western Balkan region. 
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time the very identity of both the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation was 
questioned or even denied by many in both Greece and Bulgaria. Macedonian 
politicians capitalised on the popular feeling that outsiders opposed the right of the 
Macedonians to have ‘their own’ nation-state, to call it Macedonia, and to call 
themselves Macedonians. The Albanian parties, in contesting the nation-state 
constitution, became attached in Macedonian nationalist discourse to the series of 
enemies or ‘negative others’, against which they endeavoured to forge Macedonian 
unity and a new political identity. According to the Albanian parties, this barrier 
was deliberately created and maintained by the representatives of the Macedonian 
majority who used their electoral dominance unjustly in order to maintain the 
political, social and economic subordination of the Albanians. The Albanian parties’ 
discourse therefore constructed a link between the lack of an appropriate collective 
status and subordination (Adamson Kevin and Dejan Jovic. 2004: 293-311).  
From the other side, the nationalistic ambitions of certain political 
representatives of the Albanian minority overcome the framework of gaining more 
rights and manifested itself by proclamating the creation of “Greater Albania”. This 
produced fear in the Macedonian majority concerning the unitary character of the 
state. The product of the lack of integration of the Albanians in Macedonian 
institutions and radical nationalistic pretensions toward secession, as well the 
general regional instability produced by the Kosovo crisis produced armed conflict 
in 2001. The end of the conflict resulted in the Ohrid Framework Agreement and 
further reforms, which addressed such issues as equal representation, use of the 
language and symbols of ethnic groups, decentralization and education.11    
The last tendencies are moving toward the parallel processes of nation 
building among Macedonians and Albanians in the sense of symbolic usage of the 
identity manifestation. This is stimulated mainly by political representation on the 
ethnic level and boosted by segregation in educational processes on all levels. Bi-
                                                          
11 In International Crisis Group from August 2011, there are incidents which can influence 
negatively on the coexistence. They noticed progress in equal representation, 
especially in the division of resors in newly formed government. “The scope of 
Albanian language usage was one of the most difficult issues in the Ohrid 
negotiations. Albanians demanded “equal status” with Macedonian. Macedonians 
argued this would break the first basic principle of the agreement that “the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia as well as the unitary character of 
the state cannot be violated and must be sustained” “ (Macedonia: Ten years of 
conflict, 2011: 1-27). 
“But education is becoming more segregated. In some schools with children of 
different ethnicities, there is studying in separate shifts or buildings. At the extra-
curricular level, there is “no institutional support for stimulating positive inter-ethnic 
cooperation”.” (Ibidem) 
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national prospects are jeopardizing the multicultural definition of the state. But the 
real challenge is not in modification of unification of parallel national prospects, but 
in keeping the unitary character of the state and state building in the sense of 
manifesting mutual loyalty toward the institutions. This demands further integration 
without assimilation, but also regional stability, which can be provided, by 
integration of the Republic of Macedonia into EU and NATO.      
EU and NATO integration were always top priorities in Macedonia’s 
strategic interests.  According to Jurekovic, in order to keep its mainly positive 
influence on the process of nation and state building in the Western Balkans, the EU 
must take care of the following challenges: 
- The EU must provide the countries of the Western Balkans not only with a 
list of standards they should implement, but also with a clear time-table with 
regard of their integration into the EU. Otherwise the EU-integration process 
could become too abstract and therefore lose its attraction for the Western 
Balkan countries, which could then fall back into the old antagonist scheme 
(Jurekovic, 2005: 210-224). In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, the 
setback produced by decision of Greece to obstruct NATO  integration at the 
Bucharest summit, and the delay of the start of formal negotiations for EU 
membership due to regional instability can create preconditions for eventual 
future destabilization in the country.       
- Political stability very much depends on satisfying economic conditions. 
The Balkan countries still have big problems in this regard. The high 
unemployment rate (30-40% in most of the western Balkan countries) will 
not get under control without the structural funds of the EU (Ibidem). In this 
context we offered analyses in previous part of this paper. The support from 
EU funds can be crucial in next decade.  
- In order to remain an important political factor the EU must not 
overestimate its influence. For the EU there is only a thin line between 
playing a constructive role and lapsing into colonial behavior (Ibidem). 
Partnership between the EU and Macedonia depends on concessions from 
both sides. The EU can provide support in establishing structural reforms, but 
this does not mean that the Macedonian government’s does not have the right 
independently to define state priorities. The last remark also does not exclude 
the responsibility of political representatives in Macedonia for making 
political decisions.   
- The EU can only be successful if it holds strong links to NATO and the 
USA. The EU has shown its willingness to take over the responsibility for 
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Peace Support Operations in the Western Balkans from NATO. But still 
NATO’s presence is very important for the successful transformation of the 
armed forces of the Balkan countries. The EU, NATO and PfP accession 
processes are all congruent processes that contribute to a system of co-
operative security in the Western Balkans (Ibidem).  
Political stability and the development of democratic capacities are at 
the core of the definition of Macedonian society. Developing democratic capacities 
depends on the concrete political action of all partners in the political processes, and 
development of institutional capacities of the state organization in general. The first 
action depends on the work of the Parliament, including political dialog between 
ruling and opposition parties and successful organization of elections, as concrete 
political events. The reforms in concrete segments of the state institutions are also 
priority for successful state and nation building in the future. The focus in the last 
years has been on functioning of public administration, judiciary reforms and the 
media (Macedonia: Ten years after the conflict, 2011: 1-27). 
“Name issue” has become the main obstacle for integration of the Republic 
of Macedonia into the EU and NATO, at the same time not allowing faster 
economic development and creating the situation of potential future economic or 
political destabilization. Despite the fact that Macedonia was the only former 
Yugoslav Republic to become independent without war, nation and state-building 
there has developed under difficult external and internal conditions: Greece still 
refuses to recognize Macedonia under its official name. Jurecovic states that the 
Greek explanation that the Macedonian government could raise territorial claims on 
the northern part of Greece with the name Macedonia seems ludicrous. 
Nevertheless, the consequent pressure applied by Greece on this issue meant that 
Macedonia has had to accept the supplement “Former Yugoslav Republic” to its 
name. For that reason Macedonia is the only successor of the Socialist Yugoslavia, 
which as far as its name is concerned, is not allowed to end its Yugoslav chapter 
(Jurekovic, 2005: 210-224). 
The basic models of nation- building in the Republic of Macedonia include 
both, civil and ethnic aspects. In the “Name Issue” conflict, the main reason for 
Greece is to limit every national building myth in today’s territory of Republic 
Macedonia. In this way Greece should gain a monopoly not only on the Ancient 
Macedonian heritage of Alexander the Great, but also on Slav Macedonian 
originated values of  Cyril’s and Methodius origins from Salonika. The problem for 
the Republic of Macedonia is that the most prominent forefathers of the nation such 
as Goce Delchev or Krste Misirkov, also have their origin in today’s “Greek 
Macedonia”. At the same time the Greek nation building process creates the vision 
of so called “Slavophone” population, people who speak the Slavic language, but 
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are Greeks by nationality, which is based on the power of “legitimate” assimilation 
of 19-th century “Greek high culture”, and which can be considered rasist. In recent 
history, this created situations of genocide against the Macedonian minority, 
including the last case in the Greek Civil War period when more than 25 thousand 
Macedonian children were expelled from their homes. Finally, the Greek argument 
of monopolization of the name from the Macedonian side is not the product of the 
desire of the Macedonian state or institutions, but the international status of the 
Republic of Macedonia. 
 
Conclusion 
Balkanization is a term the symbolic meaning of which was established in 
the mid nineteen century Balkans, later becoming synonymous with fragmentation 
and backwardness even outside of its native region. Building the stereotypes for the 
region of the Balkans is closely connected with the Western view of the Oriental 
Otherness. The political significance of generating visions is pre determined by the 
character of those visions. Military, economic and cultural superiority in last two 
hundred years allowed privileged the West to construct their own view for the 
Balkan people, which can be subsequently projected and accepted by the very 
people they were created to represent. In this sense, the newly coined term “West 
Balkan”, as a political creation of the EU bureaucracy, was projected as symbolic 
waiting room for one part of the Balkan countries. But tendencies for “West-
Balkanization” are not to offer fast international prospects, but by ghettoizing, to 
isolate some of the problematic issues in the wider region of the Balkan. At the 
same time, in the future the pejorative stereotypes are expected to shift from 
“Imaginative Balkan” to “Imaginative West- Balkan”. 
West Balkan contains all three of the remaining open national questions in 
the region: Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian, but also contains the majority of 
Balkan Muslim population (with the exception of Turkey). This imposes unstable 
political perspectives on the region, and also connects it with its Ottoman past and 
with future influence from Republic of Turkey. Every future destabilization of one 
of the mentioned national questions, or other political action, can be expected to 
influence and even destabilize this entire region. 
The Republic of Macedonia as an integral part of the West Balkan region is 
subjected to all previously mentioned problems. The future prospects of the country 
depends on several factors, such as regional stability, economic development, inter-
ethnic relations, EU and NATO integration, inner political stability and 
development of democratic capacities and solving the Name Issue.          
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